Today, as a welcome back coffee event sponsored by the Cairo American College PTO, we had the opportunity for a presentation entitled "An Overview of Egypt Today." As you can see from the poster, David Kirkpatrick, chief Middle East correspondent for the New York Times was slated to be the speaker. Unfortunately, David ran into bit of a conflict this morning and was unable to attend--he did not bail on the gathering all together, but found his own worthy replacement in colleague and rival journalist Jeffrey Fleishman of the Los Angeles Times, also their chief regional correspondent.
I would not classify the presentation as riveting as it was largely a recap of what nearly all of the 180-ish in the room already knew after months and years in Egypt during this tumultuous time; however, once we got to some Q&A, putting that shared-knowledge and experience into the conversation, we were able to get quite an informative and noteworthy presentation.
Here are a few of my takeaways in understanding where we are, from where we've been, and what that means for where we are headed in Egypt today...
The Muslim Brotherhood and the "opposition" are very "embryonic," for different reasons.
The Muslim Brotherhood has actively been building a support base and learning the political ropes for decades, so they don't seem like newcomers--but, they are newcomers to power. The MB does not have a history of being the decision maker, and it is showing in their first year of power by majority and with new President Morsi. Though they are trying to work out many new things, they're still really relying on the "old playbook" of the former regime and allowing a lot of government to continue as they were while they (MB) try to figure what's next and how to steer the ship. For example, early in the leadership of the new President, there was the economic and social presentation of a "new renaissance," which sounded great, but there were not a lot of concrete, measurable steps to take to see such a transformation of the country--and, the economy is in really rough shape, but there seems to be a struggle to implementing the free-market model of the west (which is desired by the MB) with the ongoing nationalistic/socialistic ideals and frameworks that have been inherited and expected among the masses. So, for all the political experience that the MB has gained through decades of being an outsider to the Mubarak regime, the actual experience of leadership with power is lacking.
Meanwhile, the "opposition" is not even that far along in the process--they're still trying to find their identity, clearly state their goals, and develop their own support base. Many youth are disillusioned from the state of the country, and though they may be opposed to what has happened, they're still lacking a clear sense of redirection and purpose. Similarly, though the Salafi movements have sided with the Muslim Brotherhood in the past Presidential and Constitutional votes, they are still trying to carve out their own separate identity, and in the process they have been splintering into different camps over the past two weeks.
Where are the military and the police?
I thought that Fleishman offered the best point of the presentation through this part of the dialogue. He stated that the military, though remaining in the Constitution as broadly and loosely defined as the "protectors of the state," they are happy with their separation and ability to be antonymous from the political landscape at this time. Fleishman felt that they got their wish in the controversial Constitution, and they've retreat to hopefully see their stature as the most respected and powerful force in Egypt restored--a stature that definitely took a hit during their temporary term in leadership of the country.
The police, Fleishman feels are still trying to figure out who they are and to whom they answer. He said he did a piece on "who are the police" recently in which he interviewed an average police officer, revealing his modest living and pay. He shared that the officer felt like they were kept at such meager pay that actually encouraged the system of bribes that many fell into, and not feel trapped in until the government brings a change. In Fleishman's interviews among the poorer residents of Cairo, they complain that the police used to be everywhere even though they didn't do much, but now they are no where to be seen. Though the economy has to remain a strong focus for the government, maintaining order has to also be an issue--yet, with declining economy, how do you fund a transformation of law enforcement?
Everyone wants Egypt to be stable.
The US wants Egypt as a stable ally in the Middle East, as well as to continue to honor their treaty with Israel; as a result, though they have made some comments about abuse of power, respecting minority and women's rights, they have really been vague and silent often so as not to appear to be beating up on a country in trouble. Israel wants Egypt to be stable, and doesn't want to give reason for bad words to be exchanged between the two. Turkey wants to be the model of democracy and leadership in the Middle East and recognizes that influence with Egypt would go along way toward that; similarly, and conversely, Qatar wants to be viewed as a major axis of power and influence in the region, and so they have willingly been coming to the financial aid of Egypt. Iran, the Saudis, and others all want Egypt stable, for various reasons, and all are attempting to exercise influence and earn relational favor in the process.
Silver linings versus darker storm clouds.
The upcoming parliamentary elections this spring could offer some hope. Most democracies appear to have two ends of the political spectrum, conservative and liberal, that dominate the election issues and ballot boxes. If, proposed Fleishman, the "opposition" can become that liberal end of the political spectrum, compared to the conservative end of the Muslim Brotherhood, by faring well in the parliament elections, then Egypt could be headed in the direction of a stable democratic system with good debate and opportunity for believe in the political process. This is a big challenge in the coming months as they have got to organize, clarify, and connect with the populace. Low voter turn out has worked against the "opposition" over the past year, and it has gotten worse with each vote.
But, the economy could lead to a worse revolution. The current hope of economic stability and reform hinges on a loan by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)--that loan is contingent on some aggressive government tax increases, as well as some reduction in subsidies. The subsidies and the lower prices have been vitally important for the at least 40% of the population who live on less than $2/day. There is legitimate concern that a loss of subsidies on bread, oil, cooking or transportation fuel could lead to a state of "desperation" among an already struggling populace in the midst of difficult times. Fleishman pointed out that the January 25 Revolution that led to Mubarak's ouster began with the young people and was eventually aided by the middle class, but that the lower socio-economic class and rural centers of population were not very involved, if at all. If the lower socio-economic class created a revolution of desperation, Fleishman proposes that it would be much more violent in nature because the goal would not be political.
Where Egypt goes from here is still a question mark. What we do know is that we were called and sent into Egypt for such a time as this--and as the country continues to figure out their course, we're waiting and watching for what God does within and through us. Thank you for your continuing interest and support through prayers and encouragement.
Where Egypt goes from here is still a question mark. What we do know is that we were called and sent into Egypt for such a time as this--and as the country continues to figure out their course, we're waiting and watching for what God does within and through us. Thank you for your continuing interest and support through prayers and encouragement.
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